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ABSTRACT: Implicatures are described as particular forms reasoning from best explanation, in which the para-
digm of possible explanations consists of the possible semantic interpretations of a sentence or a word. The need 
for explanation will be shown to be triggered by conflicts between presumptions, namely hearer’s dialogical 
expectations and the presumptive sentence meaning. What counts as the best explanation can be established on 
the grounds of hierarchies of presumptions, dependent on dialogue types and interlocutors’ culture. 
KEYWORDS: interpretation, implicatures, Grice, argumentation schemes, best explanation, presumptive 
reasoning. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When we talk, discuss, argue or negotiate we use our utterances to achieve a specific 
communicative goal, consisting in producing a specific effect on our interlocutor. The 
addressee of our speech act can be affected by our move because he or she can under-
stand our intention from what we say. Grice (1989: 220) pointed out this discursive di-
mension of meaning considering the relationship between the conventional meaning of 
the words used (the sentence), and the dialogical goal that they are aimed at pursuing 
(Grice 1975: 44). He noticed that we often use the explicit semantic content to communi-
cate information different from what is semantically encoded; for instance, we can use 
interrogative or affirmative sentences to perform acts different from questions or asser-
tions (Lyons 1977: 848). On this perspective, words are conceived as instruments to ex-
press what is said and communicate what is meant; they provide reasons to support the 
reconstruction of a specific dialogical intention (Grice 1989: 221). The relationship be-
tween what is said and what is meant is guaranteed by the “ordinary usage”, a principle 
that Grice compares to the non-linguistic presumption that, “we usually intend the conse-
quences of our actions” (Grice 1989: 222). However, what happens when this presump-
tive meaning defaults? What causes the failure of the presumptive association between 
expression and meaning? What is the reason or the process of reasoning underlying the 
recovery of the lost meaning?  
 On Grice’s view, what a man says needs to be considered within the context of 
the expectations and presumptions of the community of speakers he belongs to (Grice 
1975: 47). Grice collected such presumptions and expectations under general categories 
conceived as communicative norms (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 162). If an utterance su-
perficially appears not to conform to the presumptions that the speaker is cooperative and 
is speaking truthfully, informatively, relevantly, perspicuously, and otherwise appropri-
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ately, the hearer tries to explain this failure by reconstructing a new unconventional 
meaning for the sentence (Bach 2003: 155). How can a speaker recognize that a presump-
tion has been violated? What reasoning process does he or she trigger to retrieve the 
speaker’s meaning? Why can the same dialogical move be differently interpreted, and 
how can be different interpretations evaluated?  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the reasoning underlying the implicit recon-
struction of meaning, analyzed in previous studies as intuitive or heuristic (Allott 2005: 
234-235), from an argumentative perspective, where “argumentative” is conceived in a 
broader sense to include a reasoning process implicitly suggested by the speaker and im-
plicitly performed by the hearer aimed at retrieving the goal of a discourse move. Impli-
catures will be analyzed as implicit arguments, based on a pattern of reasoning leading 
from an explicit premise and background knowledge to an implicit conclusion. 
2. INTENTIONS AS PREDICATES 
Grice introduced a pragmatic account of meaning, where “meaning” is the effect on the 
interlocutor of a move, or act, in a dialogue. However, how can we describe the “dialogi-
cal effect” of a move? In argumentation, dialogical moves are considered as instruments 
to bind the interlocutors to dialogical obligations (Walton and Krabbe 1995). By perform-
ing a speech act, the speaker becomes tied to specific commitments, and at the same time 
he or she restricts the interlocutor's possible replies to some possible prosecutions of the 
dialogue (Walton 1989: 65-71). For instance, an assertion binds the speaker to the state-
ment asserted, while the other party can keep a record in a dialogue of what has been 
said, and choose to continue the dialogue maintaining the subject matter mentioned in 
speaker’s assertion, or interrupt the conversation (also by changing dialogue or dialogue 
game). Similarly, asking a question commits the interlocutor to the choice between continu-
ing the dialogue (by answering the question), or interrupting the conversation by challeng-
ing the question. In both cases, the interlocutor is faced with a new alternative. He or she 
may accept the direction of the dialogue, and continue the conversation according to the 
new commitments; otherwise he or she can interrupt it, either by challenging its reasona-
bleness or acceptability, or simply by not replying. However, the interlocutor needs to 
comply with new communicative constraints. It would be somehow dialogically incoherent 
to reply to the assertion “Bob has got a new cat” with the utterance “My grandmother is 
old”, or to answer, “I haven’t met your sister recently” to the question, “Have you seen 
Bob?” The utterance changes the interlocutor’s condition in the dialogue. The utterance 
faces him or her with a choice between specific alternatives.  
 This dialogical perspective of meaning subordinates the performance of single 
speech acts to the compliance with high-level conditions imposed by an abstract dialogi-
cal intention. Grice represented such a dialogical meaning using the notion of “direction” 
of the dialogue, by which the possible future moves need to abide:  
Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would 
not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative ef-
forts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of pur-
poses, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the 
start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the ex-
change; it may be fairly definite, or it may he so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude 
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to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, SOME possible conversa-
tional moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. (Grice 1975: 45) 
This dialogical intention connecting all discourse moves according to specific pragmatic 
conditions can be represented as a high-order predicate commonly referred to as a “rhe-
torical predicate” (Grimes 1975: 209), “logical-semantic connective” (Crothers 1979; 
Rigotti 2005) or “coherence relation” (Hobbs 1979: 68; Hobbs 1985). This abstract predi-
cate connects discourse sequences explicitly or implicitly. In the first case the purpose of 
the predicate is made explicit and its set of coherence conditions imposed on its argu-
ments (Grimes 1975: 162) represents a dimension of its semantic structure. Grice ana-
lyzed such conditions and implicit information, partially codified in the connector struc-
ture, as conventional implicatures (Grice 1975: 45). For instance, in the sentences,  
(1) I am very thirsty, but I cannot drink anything. 
(2) He is an Englishman. Therefore he is brave. (Grice 1975: 44) 
the connector ‘but’ presupposes (in the aforementioned sense) two sequences, p (I am 
very thirsty) and q (I cannot drink anything) such that p must be interpreted as an argu-
ment supporting a conclusion r (I need to quench my thirst) (p→r), and q as supporting 
the contrary or contradictory conclusion non-r (I cannot quench my thirst) (Ducrot 1978). 
Similarly, the connector ‘therefore’ presupposes that the second sequence (“being brave”) 
is a consequence of the first (“being an Englishman”). The discourse relation can be also 
implicit when the coherence requirements (presuppositions) are not part of the connector 
semantic structure, but need to be reconstructed (Ballard, Conrad and Longacre 1971) in 
order to understand the role of the discourse segments or sequences. For instance, coordi-
nation can express temporal, causal, explanation relations.  
 From a pragmatic perspective, discourse relations can be considered as high-
level speech acts (Grice 1989: 362; Carston 2002: 107-108), indicating the role of the 
first level speech acts, or rather, their felicity conditions (Vanderveken 2002: 28). The 
text is therefore thought of as a hierarchy of predicates connecting sequences. For in-
stance, a dialogue between friends on Bob’s difficult situation may be conceived as a 
hierarchy of dialogical goals, of which the highest and most general could be “to impress 
the hearer”, or “to arouse his pity”, etc. and each dialogical move is aimed at achieving a 
subordinate dialogical effect (Asher and Lascarides 2003). The speaker may interest the 
hearer in the topic by asking him a question on his knowledge of Bob’s condition, and 
proceed with a sequence of moves whose purpose is to gradually lead the other party to 
the main goal. Each move is reasonable only if specific conditions are complied with.  
 These conditions can be conceived as pragmatic presuppositions (see 
Vanderveken and Searle 1985: 66-67; Bach 2003: 163), as they express the conditions for 
a possible effect of a dialogical move. In addition to such conditions, speech acts need to 
be reasonable to be meaningful to the interlocutor and bring about a possible dialogical 
effect. They need to be connected to shared knowledge, namely the knowledge that par-
ticipants in a dialogue share, such as encyclopedic information (knowledge of the world, 
of the news, of the common acquaintances…) or linguistic information (lexical meaning). 
Such information is taken for granted, pragmatically presupposed by the speaker. For 
instance the utterance  
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(3) Have you seen Bob? 
will be “void” if the interlocutor does not know who Bob is, or if he or she has never seen 
Bob before (see Austin 1962: 50-51). Even if it is possible to reconstruct (or rather accom-
modate, see Lewis 1979) the existence of an individual called Bob, the hearer cannot relate 
such a person to his or her background knowledge (Asher and Lascarides 1998) and inter-
ests. As a consequence, the dialogue cannot be continued, as the conditions for its continu-
ance are not fulfilled. These conditions can be different in nature. For instance, in (1) we 
need to know that “thirsty people need to drink”, and that “drinking quenches thirst”. At a 
dialogical level, dialogical moves need to meet dialogical requirements. For instance, in all 
the aforementioned examples the hearer needs to know and be interested in the subject mat-
ter. Otherwise there would not be any need to continue the dialogue. The dialogue sequenc-
es in a text are therefore connected not only to the communicative intention, but also to the 
common ground, or context, including mutual knowledge (for this concept see Clark 1996). 
We can represent the structure of a dialogical predicate as follows (see Rigotti 2005):  
(4) Bob murdered his friend. Therefore he is a criminal.  
 
Fig. 1. Dialogical predicates and pragmatic presuppositions 
Every discourse move is therefore connected to a conversational situation, including the 
interlocutors, their knowledge, their interests as well as previous and future moves, by an 
abstract relation imposing specific constraints and requirements relative to the listener’s 
knowledge, intentions and expectations. How is it possible to presuppose such infor-
mation? How is it possible to know what our interlocutor knows, accepts or intends?  
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3. PRESUPPOSITIONS AS PRESUMPTIONS 
Presuppositions are requirements for the felicity, or dialogical meaningfulness, of a 
move, but they depend on the other’s mind. They display a world, and at the same time 
subordinate the reasonableness of displaying this world to the interlocutor’s acceptance. 
This twofold dimension of presupposition can be described by considering presupposi-
tions as implicit acts of a kind.  
 Ducrot first introduced the notion of act of presupposing. On his view, the 
speaker, by subordinating his statement to the acceptance, or (relative) truth, of its pre-
suppositions, performs a specific implicit speech act (Ducrot 1968: 87). Presupposing is 
conceived as the act of setting the conditions for the continuation of the future dialogue 
game (Ducrot 1991: 91), while the refusal to accept a presupposition amounts to inter-
rupting the dialogue, just like knocking over the chessboard. However, some presupposi-
tions cannot be acceptable by the interlocutor. For instance, the following utterance,  
(5) Bob’s sister went to the cinema last night. 
presupposes that a person called Bob is known to the interlocutor, and that Bob has a sis-
ter. Such presuppositions can be reconstructed from the sentence structure (Lewis 1979: 
340), but cannot be accepted by a hearer who knows that Bob has no sisters, or who does 
not know Bob at all (Asher and Lascarides 1998). In order to account for the meaningful-
ness of a move, we need to consider not only the possibility of reconstructing a presuppo-
sition, but also the acceptability of such a reconstruction, which involves knowledge of 
the hearer’s knowledge. But how is it possible to know the other’s mind?    
 Stalnaker (1974) and Burton-Roberts (1989) point out that presupposition does 
not imply prior assumption of the interlocutor’s knowledge of the presupposed proposi-
tion. They maintain that, from a linguistic point of view, a predicate needs some condi-
tions to be fulfilled; however, the setting of such conditions cannot be considered as an 
act of displacing a world, but rather a dialogical act of guessing (Stalnaker 1998: 8). 
Building on Stalnaker's view, we can notice that this guess needs to be made on the 
grounds of information that everybody knows because it represents communicative or 
linguistic rules, normal human behavior or connections between facts. In an argumenta-
tive perspective, we can call it an act of presumption (Freeman 2005: 43), which can be 
defined as defeasible reasoning in lack of evidence (Rescher 1977: 1). Rescher helpfully 
outlined the structure of this type of inference as follows: 
 Premise 1: P (the proposition representing the presumption) obtains whenever 
the condition C obtains unless and until the standard default proviso D (to the ef-
fect that countervailing evidence is at hand) obtains (Rule).  
 Premise 2: Condition C obtains (Fact). 
 Premise 3: Proviso D does not obtain (Exception). 
 Conclusion: P obtains. (Rescher 2006: 33) 
The relationship between P and C (the Rule) can be grounded on rules (of law, behavior 
or language) or merely on experience (Thayer 1898: 314; Greenleaf 1866: 49; McBaine 
1938: 525), and according to its probability it can shift the burden of proof (Best et al. 
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1875: 571; Walton 1993: 139-140). Presuppositions can be described as presumptions, as 
they are implicit conclusions on the other’s behaviour or knowledge, drawn in conditions 
of lack of evidence. For instance, a speaker can utter to a friend (5) above because he or 
she is acting on the presumptions that, “People know their friends and their friends’ rela-
tives” and “Information relative to friends is interesting” (Kauffeld 2003: 140; Kauffeld 
1998). The speaker proceeds from these generic rules of behavior, from his own 
knowledge concerning Bob, and from the fact that Bob is a hearer’s friend.  
 Dialogical presumptions are different in kind. The speaker can presume the oth-
er’s knowledge of people or facts, or connections between events, or linguistic and dia-
logical rules. For instance, we can analyze the presumptions underlying the following 
example (case A – the drunkard captain):  
The captain wrote in the ship's log: "The first-mate was drunk all day". When the first-mate 
read the log, he confronted the captain. The captain replied: "Well, it was true, wasn't it?". 
The following day the first-mate, whose normal duties include writing up the ship's log, got 
his revenge. He wrote in the ship's log: "The captain was sober all day". (Fischer 1970: 272) 
The first mate, in performing his dialogue move, presupposed that the crew knew who the 
captain was, but also that logbooks usually report exceptional events, and that captains 
are bound to be sober on duty. Moreover, he presupposed the relationship between the 
words uttered and their meaning and the values normally associated with a drunkard cap-
tain. Such presumptions are different in nature, strength, and dialogical effect. The rela-
tionship between a sentence and its effect, and more generally, between the use of lin-
guistic instruments and their purpose, is a pragmatic presumption, which can be referred 
to as presumption0. The principles guiding the conclusion about the hearer’s knowledge 
are epistemic presumptions, which we can also call presumptions1. Finally, the usual 
connection between facts and events, representing the expected and ordinary course of 
things, are close to the legal notion of presumptions of fact and can be labeled as pre-
sumption2. In everyday reasoning we use such presumptions2 whenever we talk about a 
person’s character, or most of the objects surrounding us. We go to the supermarket pre-
suming2 that it has not been destroyed; we trust a friend presuming2 that he has not be-
come unreliable in the last few hours. The character of our friend, the continuance of ex-
istence of the supermarket are not proven, but simply inferred from a type of knowledge 
that does not reflect how things are (or how they are perceived by us), but how things are 
usually related to each other. The different types of presumption can be thought of as a 
specific type of shared knowledge, and can be represented as in Fig. 2. 
 As Kauffeld noticed, such ordinary presumptions do not always shift the burden 
of proof; however, they place on the interlocutor a different type of burden, the “risk of 
resentment, criticism, reprobation, loss of esteem” in the event he or she does not accept a 
presumptive conclusion (Kauffeld 1998: 264). Depending on the strength and nature of 
the presumption, the communicative risk of criticism may vary. For instance, not sharing 
pragmatic presumptions may lead to criticism regarding a speaker’s ability to communi-
cate; epistemic presumptions often carry a risk of negative judgment on the interlocutor’s 
interests and knowledge (“Everyone knows that!” or “How can you be indifferent to x?”); 
finally, failure to accept factual presumptions shared by everybody may result in an ac-
cuse of poor judgment. For instance, replying “Why?” to the arguments “This is a bird; 
therefore it flies”, or “He is a blind man. He cannot have seen the accident” would be 
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usually perceived as awkward. The force of an act of presupposing also consists in an 
implicit threat of a negative ethical, epistemic or communicative judgment.  
 
Fig. 2. Types of implicit knowledge and presumptions 
The dialogical act of presupposing is therefore distinguished from presupposition. While 
presupposition is a linguistic fact, referring to the conditions of meaningfulness of a dia-
logue move, presupposing is the act of deploying epistemic, pragmatic and factual pre-
sumptions and subjecting the meaning of the move to them. The act of speaking, or rather 
the act of performing dialogical moves, is grounded on an implicit act of presuming, that is, 
reasoning from principles that are, or anyways should be, shared. 
4. CONFLICTS OF PRESUMPTIONS 
Dialogical moves are built on and communicated through different types of presump-
tions. Speakers can communicate their intention relying on the presumptive relationship 
between sentence and purpose; they can convey a specific semantic meaning on the 
grounds of the usual association between word and content; they can take information for 
granted based on epistemic presumptions and correlations between things and events. The 
process of interpretation can be considered as a complex process of reasoning from pre-
sumptions, largely proceeding from the defeasible modus ponens (Lascarides and Asher 
1991: 57). Sometimes, however, the speaker decides to convey the meaning resorting to a 
different strategy, consisting in breaching the dialogical expectations. Instead of relying 
on presumptions, the speaker can decide to deliberately presuppose inconsistent presump-
tions. He or she can ground the meaning of his or her moves on conflicts of presump-
tions, generating an apparent communicative failure. This process underlies the interpre-
tative phenomenon of implicatures. For instance, we can analyse the following utterance:   
Implicit knowledge
2. Factual presumptions
0. Pragmatic presumptions 
Grounds of reasoning
Basic logical rules 
(ex. What the definition is said of, the 
definiendum is said of as well). 
Customs, habits and stereotypes
(ex. What existed before will exist later on). 
Grounds of specific 
understanding 
Propositions taken for granted 
in the communicated inference 
(ex. Bob is a friend of mine)
Dialogical roles
(ex. I am your boss).
1. Epistemic presumptions 
The interlocutor’s knowledge 
(ex. A person knows information of his own 
family). 





(6) Can you pass the salt?  
This interrogative sentence is presumed0 to be used to request information; such a dialog-
ical intention requires that the speaker does not know the answer, and presupposes that 
the interlocutor may know it. Such requirements can be met in a context in which the 
listener is a physically impaired person, or an interlocutor having an arm in plaster. How-
ever, in a normal context, the requirements of the presumed dialogical intention conflicts 
with the factual presumption2 that “people can usually perform ordinary actions”. This 
conflict leads to a failure of the presuppositions of the presumed speech act, which results 
in an apparent infelicity. The apparent lack of a communicative effect can be solved by 
attacking one of the two defaultive premises: either the dialogical predicate is interpreted 
excluding the prototypical association between sentence and intention, or the dialogical 
context is considered as non-ordinary. In an ordinary context, the dialogical presumption 
is discarded and the act becomes “indirect”, that is, its meaning is not retrieved presump-
tively (see Bach 1994: 13). This conflict of presumptions can be represented as follows:  
 
 
Fig. 3. Conflicts of presumptions and indirect speech acts 
In this case, the context provides the information needed to establish the choice between 
the two presumptions without giving rise to ambiguity. As the interlocutor is physically 
capable and not injured, the weaker, and therefore defaulting, presumption is the dialogi-
cal one. The speaker therefore is led to find another possible intention manifested by the 
utterance (to advance a request of action, in this case). This process of reinterpretation of 
the discourse move (Asher and Lascarides 2006) can be also triggered by conflicts of 
pragmatic presumptions belonging to different levels, such as between a discourse rela-
tion abstracted from a speech act and the further dialogue moves. For instance, we can 
consider the following cases of particularized conversational implicatures:  
IMPLICATURES AND HIERARCHIES OF PRESUMPTIONS 
9 
 
(7) Sam: Would you like to go to the theatre tonight?    
Tom: I have to study.  
(8) Sam: Do you want another piece of chocolate cake?   
Tom: Is the pope Catholic? 
In both cases Sam is confronted with an apparent inconsistency between the requirements 
of the discourse relations he advances (presumed0 to be proposals) and the pragmatic pre-
sumptions of Tom’s reply (in 7, his move is presumed0 to provide information; in 8, to 
request information). 
 The implicatures analyzed above can be considered as meta-dialogical, as they 
are forms of reinterpretation of a discourse move, whose presumptive meaning is subject 
to default. When pragmatic presumptions prevail over factual presumptions, the listener 
is not led to reconstruct the meaning of a move, but to retrieve the missing information. 
For instance, in case A above (the Drunkard captain), the first mate is presumed0 to pro-
vide exceptional information; this presumption conflicts with the factual one that captains 
are (should be) usually sober on duty. The abstinence from alcohol is at the same time 
presumed0 to be exceptional and presumed2 to be a normally expected condition. This 
conflict of presumptions can be represented as follows:     
 
 
Fig. 4. Conflicts of presumptions and retrieval of missing information 
This presumptive approach to meaning and implicatures shows how implicatures, or ra-
ther reinterpretation processes, are triggered. In the following section, the mechanism of 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO 
10 
reconstruction of meaning is explained in an argumentative perspective. The claim of this 
paper is that implicatures can be analyzed as implicit arguments, involving a pattern of 
reasoning leading from a specific premise to a conclusion.  
5. IMPLICATURES AS ARGUMENTS 
How can the hearer reconstruct the meaning of a dialogue move when the presumptive 
guidance to interpretation fails or is inconsistent? In such cases a complex mechanism of 
reasoning is activated, based on different possible argument schemes. This reasoning is 
particularly evident in particularized conversational implicatures, where the process of 
meaning retrieval is not crystallized in a presumptive procedure like in conventional im-
plicatures.     
5.1. Reasoning from best explanation 
The sentence written on a logbook indicating that “The captain was sober all day” can be 
differently interpreted in different contexts or cultures. For instance, if a party had been 
thrown on the ship, the captain would have been praised by that comment. If brought as 
evidence before a court, the statement would have been interpreted as representing only 
the captain’s abstinence from alcohol on that specific day. On a pirate ship it would have 
been almost take as a criticism against the captain's “temporary teetotalism”. These dif-
ferent possible interpretations can be accounted for by distinguishing between two inter-
pretative reasoning steps. The first one is aimed at resolving the conflict of presumptions 
establishing the weaker one to be rejected. In the second phase, the excluded presumptive 
conclusion is replaced with a different one.  
 In case A above, the interlocutor can explain in different ways the presumptive 
inconsistency between the presumption0 (the information provided is exceptional) and the 
presumption2 (captain's sobriety is normally expected): A) the speaker made a mistake 
(rejection of presumption0); or B) he wanted to communicate something obvious because 
he was joking (rejection of presumption0); or C) he wanted the crew to consider what he 
had written as exceptional (rejection of presumption2). The best explanation in the given 
context is grounded on the presumption0 that “The speaker usually wants to inform the 
hearer,” and therefore the presumption2 needs to be rejected and the statement considered 
as exceptional. The second reasoning step consists in the process of explaining the excep-
tionality of the captain’s soberness. A paradigm of possible explanations can be found: 
for instance, (1) that day the entire crew were drunk (there was a party); or (2) captains 
are usually drunk; or (3) the captain was sick and needed to drink to recover; or (4) the 
captain was an alcoholic. Also in this case, the best explanation is the one rebuttable by 
the weakest contrary presumption2 (see Asher and Lascarides 1995). If we consider that: 
(1') that day there was no party on the ship, that (2') usually the crew is not drunk on duty, 
nor is the captain, and (3') that illness is not usually treated with alcohol, we need to ac-
cept the conclusion that the captain was an alcoholic. On this perspective, the best inter-
pretation corresponds to the argument or reason that in a given context is less easily de-
feated by counter-presumptions, common knowledge or evidence. 
 The two steps of reasoning involving a defeasible reasoning from paradigms 
(Macagno and Walton 2010) can be represented by the argument from best explanation:  
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Argument from best explanation 
 F is a finding or given set of facts. 
 E is a satisfactory explanation of F. 
 No alternative explanation E' given so far is as satisfactory as E. 
 Therefore, E is a plausible hypothesis, based on what is known so far. (Walton 
2002: 44) 
The argumentative structure underlying the particularized implicature of the drunkard 
captain can be represented in the following figure (“presumption” is shortened to Pr.):   
 
 
Fig. 5. Argumentative structure of the Drunkard Captain 
The structure of this implicature consists in a meta-dialogical process of explanation and 
a dialogical one aimed at justifying the failure of a factual presumption. The first reason-
ing is aimed at establishing whether the presumptive interpretation of the dialogue move 
shall be sustained or replaced with another dialogical purpose. The mechanism of reinter-
pretation can stop at this level, should a better pragmatic interpretation of the move be 
found. In the drunkard captain case, however, the alternative pragmatic explanations con-
flict with stronger counter-presumptions0, and therefore the interpretative reasoning pro-




5.2. Analogical reasoning 
While the first meta-dialogical step is aimed at explaining an apparent lack of dialogical 
effect by determining the purpose of the move, the goal of the second phase is to specify 
the content, or rather the specific purpose, of the dialogical act. This second re-
interpretative step can be grounded on different patterns or argument schemes, such as 
reasoning from best explanation, as seen above, or analogical reasoning. For instance, we 
can analyze (8) above and (9) below:  
(8) Sam: Do you want another piece of chocolate cake? 
Tom: Is the Pope Catholic?  
(9) Sam: Do vegetarians eat hamburger?   
Tom: Do chickens have lips? (Yule 2008: 43-44) 
In both cases, Tom’s replies to obvious questions are not pointing out or attacking the trivi-
ality of the answer, but advance an implicit argument that we can represent as follows:  
Argument from analogy 
 Major premise: Generally, case C1 is similar to case C2. 
 Minor premise:  Proposition A is true (false) in case C1. 
 Conclusion:  Proposition A is true (false) in case C2. (Walton 1995: 135-136; see 
also Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008: 315) 
As argued in Macagno and Walton (2009), reasoning from analogy consists in abstracting 
a generic property, the functional genus, from the characteristics of the two compared 
entities or situations. This genus is an abstract category, a generic predicate under which 
the two instances fall not absolutely, but only for the purpose of the argument. For in-
stance, a ship can be like a hotel from the point of view of passengers’ rights, because it 
is a structure hosting guests. In (8) and (9) the abstract genus is the specific purpose of 
the move. The replies (“obviously yes/no”) are abstracted from the analogy between 
Sam’s and Tom’s questions (falling under the same category of “obvious questions hav-
ing obvious positive/negative answers”). However, other more specific generic predicates 
can be reconstructed according to the context. For instance, in (8) also the feature of “Be-
ing known to everyone” and (9) of “Being stupid”. In both cases the interlocutor’s ques-
tion is also affected by a value judgment.    
5.3. Practical reasoning 
Assertive statements can be also used not to inform, but to lead the interlocutor to a spe-
cific action. In such cases, the inconsistency between the requirements of the prototypical 
act of informing and the factual presumptions, or shared knowledge, can be explained by 
resorting to practical reasoning, applied to different circumstances and dialogical goals. 
For instance, we can consider the following case:  
(10) Sam: I am out of petrol.  
Tom: There is a garage around the corner. (Grice 1975: 51) 
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The statement “I am out of petrol” contradicts the presupposition of interest of the dialec-
tical predicate ‘to inform the hearer’ prototypically associated with assertive sentences. 
The speaker cannot presume that his lack of petrol may fall within an unknown hearer’s 
desire of knowledge. The presumption of lack of interest however conflicts with the 
counter-presumption2 that “People should be interested in trying to help who is in a diffi-
cult situation.” The epistemic presumption is replaced with a pragmatic one, which does 
not fulfill the requirement of a proper act of informing, but instead triggers an argument 
from appeal to pity:  
Appeal to pity 
 Individual x is in distress (is suffering). 
 If y brings about A, it will relieve or help to relieve this distress. 
 Therefore, y ought to bring about A. (Walton 1997: 105) 
Sam’s assertion is not a request for help, but triggers a recommendation to act. On the 
other hand, Tom’s reply does not fulfil the requirement of the predicate imposed by Sam, 
namely to be “a commitment or non-commitment to help”. Tom’s act, however, is not 
only a piece of information, but also an invitation to perform a specific action, as it trig-
gers a pragmatic argument from practical reasoning in which the needed premise (“In 
garages it is possible to find some petrol”) and the conclusion (“You should go to the 
garage”) are missing. The scheme is the following:  
Practical reasoning 
 Goal Premise: My goal is to bring about A. 
 Alternatives Premise: I reasonably consider on the given information that bring-
ing about at least one of [B0, B1,..., Bn] is necessary to bring about A. 
 Selection Premise: I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable or as the 
most acceptable necessary condition for A. 
 Practicality Premise: Nothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing about Bi 
as far as I know. 
 Side Effects Premise: Bringing about A is more acceptable to me than not bring-
ing about Bi. 
 Conclusion: Therefore, it is required that I bring about Bi. (Walton 1992: 89-90) 
Depending on the context, Tom’s reply can be a refusal to help (in a context in which it is 
apparent that Sam cannot get there) or a helping action (providing guidance and instructions).  
5.4. Argument from sign 
Sometimes the speaker needs to specify the reasoning from explanation narrowing down 
the possible relation between the explanandum and the explanation and providing indica-
tions for the conclusion. For instance we can consider the following implicature:  
(11) Sam: What on earth has happened to the roast beef? 
Tom: The dog is looking very happy. (Levinson 1983: 126) 
FABRIZIO MACAGNO 
14 
The representation of dog’s happiness cannot be presumed to fulfill the role of “providing 
information on the disappearance of the roast beef”. However, the relationship between 
“happiness of the dog” and “information on the roast beef” can be retrieved through an 
argument from sign: 
Argument from sign 
 Generally, if this type of indicator is found in a given case, it means that such-
and-such a type of event has occurred, or that the presence of such-and-such a 
property may be inferred. 
 This type of indicator has been found in this case. 
 Such-and-such a type of event has occurred, or that the presence of such-and-
such a property may be inferred, in this case. (Walton 2002: 42) 
The satisfaction of the dog is a result of a cause narrowed down to the food mentioned in 
Sam’s question. The requirement of the predicate provides the information needed to 
specify the argument from sign. Sometimes this information is not explicit, but it can be 
retrieved from the context or shared knowledge. We can consider the following case: 
(12) Bill goes up to Scotland every weekend. (Carston 2002: 109) 
Carston underscores that, “in different specific contexts this could implicate 'Bill's mother 
is ill', ‘Bill has a girlfriend in Scotland', 'Bill gets as far away from London as he can 
when he can', 'Bill still hasn't got over his obsession with the Loch Ness monster', etc.” 
(Carston 2002: 110). These conclusions are grounded on specific information and cultur-
ally and contextually dependent presumptions. For instance, contextual information can 
trigger the presumption2 that “People ought to stay closer to their beloved in a condition 
of need”, or “People wish to stay closer to whom they love”, or “People tend to es-
cape/chase what they hate/like”.  
6. CONCLUSION  
The mechanism triggering an implicature can be considered as an apparent dialogical 
failure. The hearer is faced with a dialogical presumption conflicting with other presump-
tions or facts that are dialogical, factual or epistemic in nature. This inconsistency wants 
an explanation, which, depending on the culture, context and shared knowledge, can be 
found in a reinterpretation of the dialogical purpose, or in a default of a factual or epis-
temic presumption. Argumentation, interpreted in a broader sense covering the implicit 
reasoning underlying a dialogical activity, can provide an instrument accounting for the 
structure of sense reconstruction. On this view, the automatic processes of interpretation 
can be analyzed as forms of presumptive reasoning (defeasible modus ponens), while the 
heuristic processes aimed at recovering a possible communicative failure as complex ar-
guments. Meaning is interpreted as a dialogical action often grounded on implicit rea-
sons. The communication of an apparent inconsistency, of a “lost” meaning, can be 
thought of as process of grounding a move on implicit reasons that need to be retrieved in 
order to understand the dialogical purpose.              
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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is not uncommon to claim that a verbal argument may be fruitfully understood as the 
external form (or the externalized part) of an internal (or mental) reasoning process. In his 
paper, Fabrizio Macagno (2011) first offers a twist, and then puts flesh to this claim. He 
provides (what to this commentator is) a novel way of analyzing, thus of understanding, 
particularized conversational implicatures as argumentative. He convincingly demon-
strates that “implicatures can be analyzed as implicit arguments, involving a pattern of 
reasoning leading from specific premises to a conclusion” (2011: 10). 
 In the following, I briefly summarize (what I take to be) the gist of his paper, 
then offer constructive criticism. My claim is that, in developing these ideas so that they 
become machine-implementable, we require a specification of what it means that a pre-
sumption P1 is pragmatically (strictly) better, or stronger, than presumption P2. That is to 
say, we would make an advance if we could at best determine, and at least formally spec-
ify, the quality or the strength of a presumption. Moreover, one should be able to test this 
account empirically (see below). 
2. IMPLICATURES AND PRESUMPTIONS 
Following H.P. Grice and others working in the tradition of natural language philosophy, it 
has become common to recognize that—with the exception of a literal employment of terms, 
if such there is—many superficially simple forms of communicative language-use require 
(both on the part of the analyst, and on the part of speaker and hearer) rather rich background 
knowledge, some of which varies with contexts, cultures, social strata, suitably specified.  
 Such knowledge, when shared by speaker and hearer, makes possible various 
kinds of felicitous communicative acts that are indirect. These are indirect in the sense 
that locutions (i.e., overt message contents) “trigger” information that is non-identical to 
the literal (sentence-)meaning of terms employed. Rather, locutions take on convention-
al(ized) meaning(s). At any rate, so we must assume for an analysis which has speaker 
and hearer communicate by sending messages across a channel. 
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 Conversely, should such knowledge fail to be shared, this may account for infe-
licitous communicative acts of the kind we normally call “misunderstandings.” In this 
sense, speaker and hearer can, and do, presume information or, in slight variation, make 
communicative use of presumptions. Insofar as we take the speaker to intend to convey 
the non-literal meaning, we can say that she implicates conventionalized meaning(s) or, 
in slight variation, makes communicative use of implicatures. 
 So far, this is a rather pedestrian account of (some aspects of) “how to do things 
with words” (Austin). Standard examples include “It’s cold in here!” employed to bring it 
about that someone more proximal to an open window than the speaker closes it, or the 
all-time favourite “Can you pass the salt?” to bring about that someone passes it, rather 
than respond with details on her ability to do so, etc.  
 Things become more interesting by turning away from conventional ones to par-
ticularized conversational implicatures. 
3. CONFLICTS 
Making the above ideas on the one hand more precise, and on the other fruitful for argu-
mentation studies, Macagno usefully distinguishes pragmatic, epistemic, and factual pre-
sumptions. Invariably, presumptions are thought of as (representable by) sentences which 
express propositional contents. Importantly, he suggests a process (“mechanism”) by 
which the hearer decodes the (otherwise implicit) intended message. 
 Provided some communicative context, certain (pragmatic, epistemic or factual) 
presumptions can conflict with each other. Speakers may use such conflicts to convey 
information beyond the overt message content. In recognizing the conflict—or so is 
Macagno’s assumption—hearers are “not led to reconstruct the meaning of a move, but to 
retrieve the missing information” (p. 9). The drunkard captain-example shows this very 
process at work.  
 Importantly, for the proposed explanation to gain force, we need to assume that 
presumptions which are accessible to both speaker and hearer are ordered by (what we 
might call) a relation of comparative rejectability/acceptability.
1
 
[T]he best interpretation [of the speaker’s communicative intent] corresponds to the argument 
or reason that in a given context is less easily defeated by counter-presumptions, common 
knowledge or facts. (2011: 11)  
 Insofar as this ordering relation can be non-problematically assumed, the rest of 
Macagno’s paper follows nicely. In particular, the process by which a speaker codes and 
a hearer decodes such information fits squarely into the schema of the “argument from 
best explanation” (ibid.). After all, the strongest (i.e., the least rejectable) presumption is 
that which features in the best explanation.  
 Moreover, the account naturally extends to analogies, practical reasoning, etc., 
which I will not discuss. Instead, in the following, I am concerned with making “pre-
sumption-strength” slightly more precise, and then turn to the question if Macagno’s ac-
count is empirically testable. 
                                                 
1
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(2003) who coined the term ‘comparative retractability’. 
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4. COMPARATIVE REJECTABILITY 
Disregarding much of the complexity of the analysis (see Macagno’s Fig, 5), assume that, 
say, three presumptions, P1 to P3, are ordered as follows. Here, ‘<’ denotes ‘is less reject-
able than,’ making P1 a stronger (or better) presumption that P2, and so on. 
(1) P1 < P2 < P3 
Just in case speaker and hearer share (1), a particularized conversational implicature 
would be felicitous. In contrast, assume that, instead of (1), the order is weaker, as in (2). 
Here, ‘≤’ denotes ‘is at most as rejectable as’, i.e., ‘is less than or equally rejectable as’: 
(2) P1 ≤ P2 < P3 
In this case, it is unclear if the conversational implicature would be felicitous. It might be, 
or not. After all, rather than arrive at the intended meaning—which requires the hearer’s 
order to be a copy of the speaker’s, i.e., (1)—the hearer might not come to a decision on 
whether to reject P1 or P2. Hence, provided there are at least two equally strong presump-
tions—and thus, in extension, at least two equally good explanations—, a speaker may 
either fail to communicate successfully. Else, the felicitous case might still involve an 
element of chance (or luck), in case the hearer opts for the intended presumption, alt-
hough she deemed another “as just as fair” (Frost 1920). 
 Generally, it stands to reason that orders of rejectability (of presumptions) are 
not a “hard fact.” As communicative contexts vary, orders may change. In principle, the 
conditions under which speakers can justifiably assume that hearers arrive at a total or-
der, as in (1)—rather than a partial one, as in (2)—, seem to be empirical conditions (ra-
ther than conceptual ones).  
 Further, rather than changing the quality of the order (partial vs. total), hearers 
may arrive at an order very different from that the speaker assumed, e.g., (3). 
(3) P1 ≤ P3 < P2  
At this point complexity arises, insofar as the hearer may have to “fix” an order such as 
(3), in case she would otherwise be unable to make sense of the hearer’s utterance. In 
other words, the assumption that the Gricean maxims (or similar) hold may lead her to 
corrections (see below). At any rate, it is such orders that we need to implement, if we 
seek to arrive at a computational model. 
4. TESTABILITY? 
If the above is accepted as a mild precisification of comparative rejectability, this may 
aid in submitting Macagno’s analysis to empirical tests. These tests might vary the com-
municative context (along dimensions to be discerned), as well as background knowledge 
and, of course, the overt and the intended message content. Moreover, one might record 
how long it takes hearers to react to such acts “with signs of understanding,” and compare 
the numbers against those established for more direct forms of communication. Assuming 
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that (more) reasoning takes (more) time, differences might indicate having corrected an 
initial order of presumptions. 
 What would the purpose of such tests be? Prima facie, isn’t it the case that, no 
matter what the outcome of testing, Macagno’s model is non-falsifiable? After all, should 
speaker and hearer fail to share common background knowledge—assume such is verifi-
able(!) independently—this, of course, explains infelicitous acts of communication. In 
particular, then, differences between the rejectability orders of speaker and hearer (see 
Section 3) can explain “communication failure.” Generally, any act of infelicitous com-
munication involving particularized conversational implicatures can be explained by re-
course to the absence of a shared order. Conversely, felicitous communication may be 
explained by pointing out that the rejectability orderings were, at some point in time, 
shared between speaker and hearer. 
 Now, is it true that we cannot arrive at a falsification? Answer: In practice, falsi-
fication will be difficult. But in principle the model does not preclude obtaining requisite 
data. That infelicitous communicative acts are explained because conditions on felicitous 
communication are not fulfilled does not subtract from the analysis’s merits. On the con-
trary, this is very much how it should be.  
 We can compare with a standard view on the kinds of empirical regularities 
commonly called “laws of nature.” Such laws only count as falsified when antecedent 
and boundary conditions are, on the one hand, within their normal range (otherwise, why 
even start a test?) and, on the other, exactly as was assumed for the sake of calculating a 
prediction about some “system”. This is sometimes expressed by saying that applied laws 
are hedged by a ceteris paribus clause (Zenker 2009). Should antecedent and boundary 
conditions have been different, then it cannot surprise to learn that a prediction is not born 
out. Hence, the law does not count as falsified. Rather, the test conditions were “bad.” 
 Clearly, there may be some difficulty in establishing independently of the felicity 
of the communicative act that, for instance, background knowledge is shared. However, 
such difficulties are practical. In sum, Macagno’s insightful analysis provides a testable 
model; hence, it deserves to be called empirical. 
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